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Abstract. Tax amnesty is an Indonesian government program which company may 
reveal its hidden asset. By paying redemption money, taxpayer is able to reveal its 
hidden asset without getting typical administrative sanction of taxation. It turned out 
that many company hiding its asset participated in this program.  That condition 
raises question regarding audit quality of financial statement of those companies. 
Audit quality is proxied by accounting firm’s reputation, industry specialization, and 
tenure. The research shows that accounting firm’s reputation had significant 
negative impact on participation in tax amnesty program in 2016, 2017, or both, and 
the amount of restatement regarding tax amnesty program. BIG - 4 accounting firms 
are associated with better audit quality, consequently, the company which audited by 
BIG-4 are less likely to participate in tax amnesty. In addition, leverage as control 
variable had significant negative impact on participation in tax amnesty program. 
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1 Research Background 
The effectiveness of tax amnesty, in long run and short run, is still debatable yet it is 
being used as fiscal policy for a national income source of a country. In short run, it might 
give the additional revenue of a country but in long run it might potentially reduce the 
future tax compliance [1] 
Development of Indonesia is rely on tax payment. More than 80% of indonesia’s 
budeging is obtained from tax payment1.  When particular citizen not participate in paying 
tax by hiding its asset, it violate the fairness and justice principles of Indonesian tax 
system. Moreover, there are Indonesia citizen investing their hidden asset abroad. Those 
hidden asset presumably can be used for Indonesian development. 
                                                          
1 Based on Indonesian Budgeting, 2018 
The hidden asset are supposed to be imposed with income tax (the normal rate is 
progressive from 5% until 30%) plus its sanction 2% per month (maximum 24 month).2 
That condition make the taxpayer reluctant to reveal their hidden asset. It is needed a 
policy which give assurance about the legal certainty and safety of the tax payer when 
they reveal their hidden asset. 
An amnesty usually permit a person or an entity to reveal its hidden asset, without 
imposed regular tax sanction and regulation [2] 
On 2016, Indonesian government launched tax amnesty policy. By paying redemption 
money, taxpayer is able to reveal its hidden asset without getting typical administrative 
sanction of taxation. The proposed rate of redemption is lower than the normal rate of tax 
income plus its administrative sanction, which is only 0.5% - 10%. In addition, tax 
amnesty participant will be granted the omission of tax payable, administrative sanction, 
tax inspection and termination of ongoing tax inspection.3 
As a fiscal policy, Indonesian tax amnesty has several purposes, firstly, to accelerate 
the economic growth through increasing domestic liquidity, strengthening the rupiah 
exchange rate, lowering interest rate, and increasing investment. Secondly, construct the 
valid, transparent, and integrated database and tax system. Thirdly, increase tax revenue 
for Indonesian capital expenditure. 
For a delinquent tax payer, willingness to participate in tax amnesty will be driven by 
cost of non-compliance, including tax inspection and future double tax fines. [3]  
In Indonesia, after termination of tax amnesty period, if the government find any 
hidden asset, it will be imposed tax fine until 200%. 
Indonesian tax amnesty has been done from September 2016 – March 2017. It gave the 
opportunity for tax payer to expose its hidden asset based on Annual Tax Return of tax 
year 2015. For the listed company, if the asset is hidden in the Annual Tax Return of 
2015, automatically it is hidden in 2015 financial statement. Consequently, the listed 
company participating in tax amnesty will restate its 2015 financial statement. The result 
shows that 131 listed companies participated in tax amnesty program. 
Even though the financial statement has been audited, when the listed company 
participate in tax amnesty and reveal its hidden asset in significant amount, the company 
must restate its financial statement. Restatement of audited financial statement can be an 
indication that the previous audited financial statement did not report the truly condition 
about auditee’s financial condition or the auditor might have been missed the material 
misstatement. It raised an intriguing question about the audit quality of the financial 
statement, especially when the financial statement gets unqualified opinion. 
International standard on auditing 200 regulate that during expressing its financial 
statements’ opinion, auditor must be able to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial 
statements are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error [4]. 
                                                          
2 Based on Indonesia Income – Tax Law 2008 article 17 
3 Basen on Indonesian Tax Amnesty Law 2016 
Audit quality can be clarified as auditor’s ability to detect and report misstatement and 
meet the legal and professional requirement [5]. Based on supply side, the audit firm will 
perform higher audit quality when it has more technical knowledge of a client's industry 
[6]. Big 4 auditors (i.e. PwC, EY, Delloitte, and KPMG) are multinational accounting 
firms which are organized as national partnerships with national administrative offices. In 
order to maintain its quality, they established standardized audit programs and apply the 
knowledge-sharing practices. Consequently, the Big 4 tend to invest heavily on staff 
recruitment and training and information technology [7]. 
This research aims to observe whether the audit quality has an effect on the tax 
amnesty participation. The research defines audit quality as auditor’s reputation, auditor’s 
industry specialization and auditor’s tenure. The research contributes a finding that 
company which is audited by BIG 4 audit firm will impose the higher audit quality, 
consequently the company will less likely to participate in tax amnesty. 
2 Hypothesis Development 
Several previous researchers have showed the indication of audit quality of the Big – 4 
accounting firms. In order to maintain its quality, regarding the restrain of abnormal 
accruals, the Big 4 are more likely to issue unclean opinion. It reflects that the Big 4 
provide more conservative accounting in order to prevent future litigation and possible 
reputation damages [7]. Regarding financial standard compliance, company which audited 
by Big-5+2 auditor are exhibit greater IFRS compliance [8]. In order to reduce 
information asymmetry, manager from ‘‘less secretive” or more transparent company are 
more commit to higher-quality audits by choosing a Big 4 auditors [9]. Moreover, 
company which located in countries with high corporate ethical values are more likely to 
hire a Big 4 auditor [10]. Big 4 auditors are persistent in maintaining their good reputation 
and conducting a thorough audit that will decrease the likelihood of audit failures [11] 
In Indonesia, the top – tier accounting firm is associated with Big-4 (e.g. PwC, 
Delloitte, KPMG and EY). Based on previous studies, Big 4 are associated with high audit 
quality, moreover, Big 4 auditors eager to protect their reputation by not involving in 
future audit failures, therefore they audit their client thoroughly in the engagement period. 
This implied that companies audited by Big 4 auditors in 2015 will less likely to 
participate in tax amnesty because of the higher audit quality. 
H1: Auditors’ reputation negatively related to participation in tax amnesty program, 
participation in tax amnesty program in 2016, 2017, or both, and the amount of 
restatement caused by tax amnesty. 
 
Previous studies show that industry specialized auditors provided higher audit quality. 
Auditee of industry specialized had a higher ranking from financial analysts in disclosure 
quality [12]. Industry specialized auditor also gave a higher assurance level [13]. It lead to 
a hyphotesis that auditee of industry specialized auditors will less likely to participate in 
tax amnesty program since they had been imposed by higher audit quality compare with 
non industry specialized auditors 
H2: Auditors’ industry specialization negatively related to participation in tax amnesty 
program, participation in tax amnesty program in 2016, 2017, or both, and the amount of 
restatement caused by tax amnesty. 
 
Longer audit tenure will impact on audit committee’s effectiveness and decrease audit 
quality [14]. Audit quality decreased in longer tenure because of auditors’ reluctance to 
issue going concern opinion. It can be conclude that prolong audit tenure with clients 
could be the cause of lower independence and objectivity due to familiarity threat [15]. 
When a client has a good control in financial reporting, accurate, low risk and integrity 
and competence top management, automatically, in the future audit engagement, the 
professional skepticism will decline with tenure. On the other hand, a new audit firm will 
have new perspective and bear the skepticism [16]. It lead that long auditor tenure leads to 
a reduction in audit quality. Consequently, the auditee which has been audited by long 
tenure accounting firm will be audited by less quality so they will more likely to 
participate in tax amnesty program. 
 
H3: Audit tenure positively related to participation in tax amnesty program, 
participation in tax amnesty program in 2016, 2017, or both, and the amount of 
restatement caused by tax amnesty. 
3 Methodology and Sample Selection 
3.1. Dependent Variable 
Participation in Tax Amnesty (RESTATE/NOT) 
In order to test the Hypothesis, whether or not the company participates in tax amnesty 
during the tax amnesty period, the research uses binomial logistic model. If the company 
participates in tax amnesty, 1 would be given. If not, it would be 0.  
Year of Participation in Tax Amnesty (RESTATE_CATEGORIES) 
Regarding hypothesis testing for robustness test, the research uses multinomial logistic 
model. It would be inputted 0 when the company didn’t participate in tax amnesty, 1 if the 
company participated in 2016, 2 if the company participated in 2017, and 3 if the 
company participated in both 2016 and 2017. 
Tax Amnesty Restatement Amount (RESTATE_AMOUNT) 
Robustness test of the research will test of the amount of tax amnesty restatement 
amount.  The research will use multiple linear regression method. The restatement amount 
is regarding the revealing of hidden asset in tax amnesty. This amount is disclosed in 
Notes of Financial Statement.  
3.2. Independent Variable 
 
Auditor’s Reputation (REPUT) 
If the auditor is Big 4 auditor, the auditor would be seen as having a good reputation 
and it would be given a value of 1. Otherwise, it would be given a value of 0.  
Auditor’s Industry Specialization (SPEC) 
Auditor’s industry specialization would be measured using the market share with 
regard to the total assets of the company [17]. 
SPEC = (Total asset of all clients audited by particular audit firm in a particular 
industry)/(Total assets of all company in the industry) 
Audit Tenure (TENURE) 
Tenure is measured by counting backwards of how long a signing audit partner have 
audited the company from 2015. Instead of counting the accounting firm tenure, this 
research uses audit partner tenure. Audit partner is used as the indicator because audit 
partner is seen as the one who can build relationship with a client that can result in 
familiarity and biasness in giving opinion. Moreover, Indonesian Government’s Law 
No.20 in 2015 article 11 stated the rules regarding rotation of audit partner for every 5 
years, not public accounting firm’s rotation. 
 
3.3. Control Variable 
The research uses several variables to control the model including firm size, leverage, 
number of operation segments, and number of subsidiaries. We also incorporate type of 
industry to mitigate the potential confounding effects across industries. 
 
3.4. Sample Selection  
Sample selection used non probability sampling method that is purposive judgmental 
sampling. There are 3 criteria used for sample of this study, (1) companies must be listed 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2017, (2) companies must also have already 
published financial statements 2015-2017, (3) the financial statement must be disclosed in 
Rupiahs. Lastly, the financial statement must be consisted of all information needed in the 
model. This process yielded 404 firms for binomial and multinomial logistic regression 
and 385 firms for multiple linear regressions. We used 2016 and 2017 data for dependent 
variables and 2015 data for independent and control variables. 
 
3.4. Empirical Model 
In this study use three regression models, i.e binomial logistis regression, multinomial 
logistic regression and multiple linear regression. The model is Y as a function of 
(REPUT,TENURE, SPEC, SIZE, LEV, SEGMENT, SUBS, DMANUF, DFIN, DSERV, 
DTRADING). Y is a dependent variable, which one of these: (1) RESTATE/NOT, a 
dummy variable set to 1 if company participates in tax amnesty program and 0 otherwise, 
(2) RESTATE_CATEGORIES, a multinomial variable set to 0 if the company didn’t 
participate in tax amnesty, 1 if it participated in 2016, 2 if it participated in 2017, and 3 if 
it  
participated in both 2016 and 2017, (3) RESTATE_AMOUNT, restatement amount 
caused by tax amnesty, which is transformed using Johnson transformation. REPUT is a 
dummy variable set to 1 if Big 4 and 0 otherwise. SPEC is market share with regards of 
company’s total assets. TENURE is tenure of signing audit partner. SIZE is log of total 
assets. LEV is total debt/total equity. SEGMENT is number of operation segments. SUBS 
is number of subsidiaries. DMANUF is a dummy variable set to 1 if company operate in 
manufacture industry and 0 otherwise. DFIN is a dummy variabel set to 1 if company 
operate in financial industry and 0 otherwise. DSERV is a dummy variabel set to 1 if 
company operate in others service industry, and 0 otherwise. DTRADING is a dummy 
variabel set to 1 if company operate in trading industry, and 0 otherwise. 
4 Result and Discussion  
4.1 Binomial Logistic Regression 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow’s Goodness of Fit of this study is 0.269 which is lower than 
0.05, indicating the fitness of the model. Nagelkerke R Square of this study is 0.258, 
meaning independent and control variables explained 25,8% of variations of the 
dependent variable. 
 
Table 1. Binomial Logistic Regression Result 
Independent 
Variable B Sig. Exp(B) 
REPUT -1.594 0.000* 0.203 
TENURE 0.033 0.830 1.033 
SPEC 0.232 0.839 1.261 
SIZE -0.269 0.133 0.764 
LEV -0.113 0.050* 0.893 
SEGMENT 0.033 0.679 1.033 
SUBS 0.042 0.000* 1.043 
DMANUF -0.398 0.366 0.672 
DFIN 0.281 0.571 1.324 
DSERV 0.264 0.532 1.302 
DTRADING 0.543 0.300 1.722 
Constant 3.325 0.115 27.792 
 
Based on the estimated parameter, Equation (1) is: 
y = p/(1-p) =Ղ^ (3.325 -1.594 REPUT +0.033 TENURE +0.232 SPEC -0.269 SIZE -0.113 
LEV +0.033 SEGMENT +0.042 SUBS -0.398 DMANUF +0.281 DFIN +0.264 DSERV 
+0.543 DTRADING) ..................................................................(1) 
REPUT is significant negative which imply that companies audited by Big 4 had lower 
probability of 0.203 times (Ղ-1,594) in participating the tax amnesty program compare 
with companies audited by non-Big 4. Meanwhile, leverage and subsidiaries have 
significant effect. Companies that have lower leverage have higher probability of 
participating in tax amnesty program. On the other hand, the higher the number of 
subsidiaries, the higher the probability of participating in tax amnesty program. 
 
4.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression  
 
Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Result - Significant Only 
RESTATE_CATEGORIES B Sig. Exp(B) 
1 (tax amnesty in 2016) SUBS 0.045 0.000 1.046 [REPUT=0] 1.494 0.001 4.453 
2 (tax amnesty in 2017) [REPUT=0] 2.141 0.011 8.505 
3(tax amnesty in 2016 & 2017) SUBS 0.049 0.000 1.050 [REPUT=0] 1.489 0.012 4.433 
 
 
Ln ௉ሺଶ଴ଵ଺ሻ௉ሺ௧௜ௗ௔௞	௥௘௦௧௔௧௘ሻ = 3.412 + 1.494 REPUT + 0.187 TENURE- 0.127 SPEC – 0.3 SIZE 
– 0.103 LEV + 0.013 SEGMENT + 0.045 SUBS + 0.156 DMANUF – 0.71 DFIN – 0.709 
DSERV – 1.040 DTRADING ...................................................................................….(2) 
Ln ௉ሺଶ଴ଵ଻ሻ௉ሺ௧௜ௗ௔௞	௥௘௦௧௔௧௘ሻ = - 3.659 + 2.141 REPUT – 0.639 TENURE + 0.429 SPEC – 0.022 
SIZE – 0.132 LEV + 0.143 SEGMENT + 0.004 SUBS + 0.463 DMANUF + 0.093 DFIN 
+ 0.880 DSERV + 0.106 DTRADING 
…...........................................................................(3) 
Ln ௉ሺଶ଴ଵ଺	ௗ௔௡	ଶ଴ଵ଻ሻ௉ሺ௧௜ௗ௔௞	௥௘௦௧௔௧௘ሻ  = - 0.092 + 1.489 REPUT + 0.030 TENURE + 0.879 SPEC – 0.318 
SIZE – 0.13 LEV – 0.011 SEGMENT + 0.049 SUBS + 0.825 DMANUF + 0.571 DFIN – 
0.016 DSERV + 0.083 DTRADING …............................................................................(4) 
 
Table 2 shows the significant result of multinomial logistic regression result based on 
equation 2, 3, and 4. Prior to this, we already test the fitness of the model. REPUT=0 has 
significant positive impact in category 1, 2, and 3. This means companies audited by non-
Big 4 auditors have higher probability to participate in tax amnesty program in 2016, 
2017, or both (2016 and 2017) compare with companies audited by the Big-4. Meanwhile, 
SUBS has significant positive impact. This means increase in number of subsidiaries 
would increase the probability of company participating in tax amnesty program in 2016 
and both years. 
 
4.3 Multiple Linear Regression 
 
Table 3. Multiple Linear Regression Result 
Independent 
Variable 
Regression 
Coefficient  t 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
(Constant) -0.734 -1.354 0.177 0.0885 
REPUT -0.323 -3.614 0.000 0.000* 
SPEC -0.194 -0.697 0.486 0.243 
TENURE 0.058 1.467 0.143 0.0715 
SIZE 0.068 1.472 0.142 0.071 
LEV -0.027 -1.913 0.056 0.028 
SEGMENT 0.018 0.920 0.358 0.179 
SUBS 0.008 4.248 0.000* 0.000 
DMANUF -0.075 -0.643 0.521 0.2605 
DFIN -0.036 -0.279 0.781 0.3905 
DSERV 0.169 1.493 0.136 0.068 
DTRADING 0.113 0.812 0.417 0.2085 
 
Based on the estimated parameter, Equation (5) is: 
 
RESTATE_AMOUNT = -0.734 -0.323 REPUT -0.194 SPEC +0.058 TENURE +0.068 
SIZE -0.027 LEV + 0.018 SEGMENT + 0.008 SUBS -0.075 DMANUF -0.036 DFIN + 
0.169 DSERV – 0.056 DTRADING 
 
The F-Test of this model is 0.000 which is less than 5%, meaning the independent and 
control variables simultaneously have significant impact on dependent variable. The F-test 
result also indicate the fitness of the equation model. The adjusted R2 in this study is 0.184 
which means that independent and control variables explained 18.4% of the dependent 
variables. 
Refer to table 3, REPUT had significant negative impact. It means companies audited 
by Big 4 have lower restatement amount caused by participation in tax amnesty program. 
Meanwhile, the only significant control variable is SUBS. SUBS had significant positive 
impact. It means that the higher the number of subsidiary, the higher the number of 
restatement amount caused by participation in tax amnesty program. 
4. 4 Analysis and Discussion  
Based on binomial logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression, and multiple 
linear regression, Auditor’s reputation (REPUT) has significant negative impact to 
participation in tax amnesty program.  
Binomial logistic regression show that companies audited by Big 4 had lower 
probability in participating the tax amnesty program 0.203 times compare with company 
audited by non-big–4.  multinomial logistic regression demonstrate that companies 
audited by Big 4 had lower probability in participating the tax amnesty program in year 
2016, year 2017, and participate in both 2016 and 2017. Lastly, multiple linear regression 
shows that companies audited by Big 4 have lower restatement amount regarding 
participation in tax amnesty program.  
This implied that Big 4 public accounting firm produce a higher quality audited 
financial statement than non-Big 4 public accounting firm. This is because Big 4 auditors 
are superior in obtaining learning experiences with a better skill and knowledge than non-
Big 4 auditors, even in short tenure [18]. This leads to them conducting a more in-depth 
audit and have found all of the clients’ assets, including the hidden ones, thus producing a 
higher quality audited financial statements than non-Big 4 auditors. It is different for non-
Big 4 auditors whose audit quality is lower, allowing their clients’ hidden asset to remain 
undisclosed in 2015 audited financial statement and leading their clients to finally uncover 
the hidden assets whilst participating in tax amnesty program and restating their 2015 
financial statement. 
For non-Big 4 clients, it means less or no hidden assets to be revealed in tax amnesty 
program because all of the assets are already revealed during the engagement period and 
disclosed in 2015 audited financial statement. Therefore, it is less likely for companies 
which audited by Big 4 auditors to participate in tax amnesty program. 
Auditor’s industry specialization has no significant impact to participation in tax 
amnesty program. Audit tenure also has no significant impact to participation in tax 
amnesty program. This is because one until 4 years engagement is not long enough tenure 
to build a closed relationship between audit partner and client that can cause biasness in 
audit opinion. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Audit quality measured by auditor’s reputation has significant negative impact 
with tax amnesty. Companies that were audited by Big 4 in 2015 have lower probability 
of participation in tax amnesty program, participation in tax amnesty program in 2016, 
2017, or both, and lower amount of restatement caused by participation in tax amnesty. 
This is because Big 4 produce a higher quality audited financial statements. Big 4 are 
superior in obtaining learning experiences (Chi and Huang, 2005). Big 4 also wanted to 
protect their reputation from any possible damages, thus leading them to an in-depth audit 
in the engagement period (Becker et al., 1998).  
We also found that leverage had significant negative impact on participation in 
tax amnesty program. The lower the leverage, the more likely the company participates in 
tax amnesty program. This is because lower leverage could indicate that company 
participates in nondebt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980 and Graham and Tucker, 
2006). Meanwhile, subsidiary had significant positive impact on participation in amnesty 
program, participation in tax amnesty program in 2016, 2017, or both, and lower amount 
of restatement caused by participation in tax amnesty. This is because there is a possibility 
of assets hidden in tax haven that were uncovered in tax amnesty program. 
For further studies, the proxy of audit quality could be varied using other proxies, 
such as discretionary accruals. Some control variables can also be added to further reflect 
the dependent variables, such as using foreign subsidiary ownership as an indicator of 
possible hidden assets that maybe uncovered in tax amnesty program. 
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